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The Sutherland Report and the Theory of WTO Law
By Chi Carmody1

The recent report of the Consultative Board to the WTO Director-General, referred to as
the Sutherland Report, deals with a number of key issues in the present and future of
WTO. Among them are globalization, non-discrimination, sovereignty, coherence, and
dispute settlement. We can legitimately wonder what motivated this selection. After all,
the WTO Agreement involves many issues. A casual review of the Sutherland Report
might suggest that the Consultative Board simply chose those issues that have been the
most politically sensitive for the organization and focused upon them.
Looked at more closely, however, something else becomes apparent. This is that there is
a common thread to most of the issues dealt with in the Sutherland Report and that they
can be understood in an integrated manner according to a theory of WTO law. The
Consultative Board may not have expressed its findings and recommendations in such
terms, but there should be little doubt that its work was motivated by a belief in legal
principle.
This is an important insight, chiefly because most theories of the WTO as a treaty and an
international institution come to us from either economics or politics. We are apt to
regard the WTO Agreement’s shape and operation as attributable to comparative
advantage or power relations, or perhaps some combination of the two. The idea that
there exists a coherent theory of WTO law seems somewhat suspect.
A number of factors reinforce such an attitude. One is the complexity of the WTO
Agreement, a document which in its official version runs more than 26,000 pages and
which contains a large number of obligations, not all of which fit together neatly. Simply
put, the treaty is so big and unkempt that it often defies the legal imagination.
Another factor is WTO dispute settlement. Because the WTO Agreement is so complex,
countries have been forced to litigate their disputes over interpretation of the treaty in
dispute settlement. The process works reasonably well, but litigation does not always
raise underlying principles of WTO law in the most comprehensive or consistent manner.
Still another factor is public perception. As the Consultative Board pointed out, the WTO
is often seen through the prism of national concerns. “Members understandably portray
the WTO in terms of domestic political preoccupations” it noted, “seldom on the basis of
the principles that underlie the system.”2 Such a partisan perspective tends to neglect the
treaty’s core values.
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That core begins with the realization the WTO is not concerned with trade per se, but
rather with the protection of expectations about the trade-related behaviour of
governments. This principle has been recognized in WTO dispute settlement on many
occasions and was acknowledged by the Consultative Board in the Sutherland Report as
follows:
The WTO is about providing opportunities – it does not provide
guarantees nor does it provide all the conditions for participation in the
global economy. In essence it says to governments: here are a set of
market opportunities for your local firms or individuals, if they are
competitive, could benefit from; here also are the rules under which they
will operate in foreign markets and under which others must be allowed to
operate in your market.3
The emphasis on expectations goes on to explain the Consultative Board’s preoccupation
with the erosion of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle. MFN requires that all
WTO members extend their most favourable trading concessions and commitments to all
other WTO members “immediately and unconditionally”. In essence, it assures that all
WTO members have the same expectation of access to the domestic market of a member
country. The Consultative Board rightly described it as being “at the heart of GATT” and
as its “central organizing rule”.4
At the same time, the Consultative Board admitted that “nearly five decades after the
founding of the GATT, MFN is no longer the rule; it is almost the exception.”5 In its
place “a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of customs unions, common market, regional and bilateral free
trade areas, preferences and an endless assortment of miscellaneous trade deals” has
arisen. The trend is of concern because it detracts from the uniformity of MFN and
therefore from the uniformity of expectations. Some recommitment to this principle is
required, the Consultative Board implied, and that it should do so is hardly surprising.
MFN is the lynchpin of the system.
However, recommitment to MFN is challenging for a number of reasons. One is the
impact that a recommitment might have on the practice of WTO decision-making by
consensus, the procedural equivalent of MFN.6 The Consultative Board appeared to
appreciate the difficulty of calling for the reinforcement of MFN without a parallel
reinforcement of consensus decision-making, currently the source of much paralysis in
the WTO’s operation. Probably as a consequence, the Sutherland Report’s
recommendation was relatively tempered on this vital point.7
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A similar explanation could be given for the Consultative Board’s cool attitude towards
“variable geometry”, or the idea that WTO obligations should differ for different
members of the organization. Variable geometry is to countenance a WTO à plusieurs
vitesses, something antithetic to the uniformity of MFN and yet, given the ‘spaghetti
bowl’ mentioned above, arguably only a recognition of the prevailing state of affairs.
Again, the Sutherland Report was cautious on this point.
A further difficulty with recommitment to MFN is the oft-expressed concern that the
uniformity of “pure” MFN does not take adequate account of real world conditions in
many developing countries. On this subject the Consultative Board took something of a
mixed view. It referred to special and differential treatment for developing countries
under the treaty as a potential trap, quoting from a 1990 study that “in the more rapidly
growing [developing] economies, such as Korea; Chinese, Taipei; Turkey and others,
there is little evidence that special and differential treatment has played much of a role in
their strong performance.”8 Nevertheless, the Consultative Board was prepared to
concede that “there is a strong case to be made that least-developed countries should have
a contractual entitlement to capacity building support to implement new commitments in
the WTO.”9
Each of the foregoing points illustrates the fact that, to some degree, the WTO Agreement
involves more than more than simply the protection of ex ante expectations. Such
protection can be seen as a base or “first position”, but here and there under the treaty are
rules that exist to allow governments to respond to ex post realities. While aware of the
fundamental need to protect expectations about conditions as they might be, the treaty
thus also takes into account certain conditions as they actually are. WTO disciplines on
safeguards, certain types of subsidies and anti-dumping action can be said to fall in this
second category. Such obligations are based on actual conditions and are more likely to
involve real trade flows.
The distinction reveals a subtle tension in the treaty, something alluded to by the
Consultative Board when it observes that “[n]either the WTO nor the GATT was ever an
unrestricted free trade charter.” In the Consultative Board’s view:
… both were and are intended to provide a structural and functionally
effective way to harness the value of open trade to principle and fairness.
In doing so they offer security and predictability of market access
advantages that are sought by traders and investors. But the rules provide
checks and balances, including mechanisms that reflect political realism as
well as free trade doctrine. It is not that the WTO disallows market
protection, only that it sets some strict disciplines under which
governments may choose to respond to special interests.10

8

The Future, para. 99.

9

The Future, para. 306.

10

The Future, para. 39.

4
Again, the Consultative Board’s observations must be examined with care, but they
appear to acknowledge that the treaty is something of a hybrid. The content of its legal
rules is dictated by the need to accommodate both aspiration and reality.
The treaty’s double aspect reveals something else too. This is about the nature of justice
under the WTO Agreement. Classically there are two forms of justice: corrective and
distributive.11 Corrective justice applies to private property and plays a rectificatory role
in transactions. Thus, when a person is wrongfully deprived of their property they are
entitled to have it returned or to be compensated. The implicit metric is equality: you get
what you’ve lost. Distributive justice, by comparison, applies to the distribution of public
goods such as “honour or money or other things that have to be shared among members
of the political community.”12 It presupposes some socially agreed means of allotment.
Consequently, the implicit metric is proportionate: you get what you’re entitled to.
As matters now stand, justice under the WTO Agreement involves member countries
taking each other before three-person panels where there is an alleged violation of the
treaty. When the complaint is made out, the panel normally recommends that the offender
bring its law “into conformity” with the WTO Agreement. Thereafter, if the parties
cannot settle the matter, they may negotiate compensation among themselves as a
temporary measure pending compliance or, as a “last resort”, the plaintiff may seek
authorization to retaliate by suspending concessions, again pending compliance. What
kind of justice does this represent?
WTO rules concerning dispute settlement suggest that the nature of justice under the
WTO Agreement is primarily distributive. Distributive justice explains why it is that the
principal remedy under the WTO Agreement is a mere recommendation of conformity: in
classic distributive fashion the recommendation insists on a return to conformity, thereby
re-establishing the distribution of expectations. Distributive justice also explains why
WTO remedies focus on prospective as opposed to retrospective relief: their aim is not so
much to repair prior or existing damage as it is to re-establish expectations in future.
Finally, distributive justice explains why the ultimate sanction in the system is the
suspension of concessions: suspension effectively denies the wrongdoer their
proportionate share of the system’s benefit.
Nevertheless, distributive justice is not the whole story of justice under the WTO
Agreement. Our observation that the treaty has an expectation-based and reality-based
aspect to it is paralleled by a similar tension between distributive and corrective justice.
Distributive justice is the dominant form of justice under the treaty, but an impulse
towards corrective justice subsists, both because several WTO obligations give the
appearance of corrective justice and because corrective justice appeals to our innate sense
of what justice should be. For instance, a wrongfully levied anti-dumping duty raises
calls for its return, even though the amount of the duty will have little to do with the
breached expectations and is not commonly considered refundable under WTO law.

11

ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (R. Crisp ed.) 85 (2000).

12

Ibid.

5
Such a situation might well explain why the Consultative Board expressed concern with
ongoing retaliation. Retaliation is a deviation from a theory of WTO law that plainly
emphasizes conformity as a means of protecting expectations. Indeed, at some point it
can begin to look a lot like corrective justice. The Consultative Board noted its concern in
this regard, observing that the persistence of retaliation in a few high-profile cases has
tended to confer an aura of legitimacy upon it:
The somewhat relaxed, even complacent, resort to such damaging trade
action is becoming serious. Also, there are worries, in particular, that some
countries, including some of the major trading partners, such as the U.S.
and the EU, are acting in a recalcitrant manner, and not taking measures
that would effectively, and in a timely manner, fulfill their obligations.13
The Consultative Board was similarly critical of suggestions to make compensation more
automatic or to permit the recoupment of legal fees in WTO dispute settlement, observing
that:
To allow governments to “buy out” of their obligations by providing
“compensation” or enduring “suspension of obligation” also creates major
asymmetries of treatment in the system. It favors the rich and powerful
countries which can afford such “buy outs” while retaining measures that
harm or distort trade in a manner inconsistent with the rules of the
system.14
The Consultative Board concluded that:
[s]ome experimentation in this regard could be useful, but great care must
be exercised to be sure that monetary compensation is only a temporary
fallback approach pending full compliance, otherwise the “buy out”
problems will occur.15
One could, of course, ascribe significance to the Consultative Board’s conclusions here
since any acknowledgment of the option to “contract out” of WTO obligations might be
construed as an endorsement of a fundamentally different view of the treaty. There may
be some truth to that view. Again, however, we have to remember how limited and
cautious the Consultative Board’s pronouncement was on this point. Elsewhere the Board
repeatedly reminded its audience that “it is extremely important that the major players
follow a policy of conforming to the obligations outlined in WTO panel and Appellate
Body reports in cases brought against them.”16 The call to conformity would appear to
reinforce a more traditional view of the WTO system.
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In sum, the Consultative Board’s conclusions can be regarded as the manifestation of a
theory of WTO law. That theory may not always be readily apparent. There are many
things going on under the treaty at once: the protection of expectations, the
accommodation to realities, and possibly even their integration together in some third,
and overarching, interest.17 As a result the total picture frequently looks confusing.
What is useful about thinking as we have here, however, is that it permits us to
comprehend what has previously appeared almost incomprehensible. Documents like the
Sutherland Report become understandable as reflections not only of political and
economic priorities, but also of legal principle. And as the Consultative Board itself
pointed out, “[t]hose principles are little known, yet as valid and valuable now as when
they were established in the last century, notably in the years after the Second World
War.”18
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